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The law's response to reproductive genetic testing depends on
a number of assumptions about choice, causation and control
which need to be questioned. From the preconception stage
forward, the illusion of choice may raise such fundamental
questions as the woman's choice not to be tested. limits on
genetic information, and the availability of reproductive options. In tum, assumptions about choice raise questions about
the responsibility for results and the connection between
choice and causation in the context of wrongful binh and life
actions. Assumptions made about control over reproductive
choice and over causing 'harm', will impact on the development of future law.

Karen H. Rothenberg

The law's response to reproductive genetic
testing depends on a number of assumptions.
It is time to reexamine assumptions that have
shaped the expansion of reproductive genetic
testing. This paper explores and questions
assumptions made about the three 'Cs' choice, causation and control.

Choice

Reproductive genetic testing assumes
choice. The choice to become pregnant or the
choice to forego pregnancy. The choice to have
a test or not to have a test. The choice to decide

what to know or what not to know. The choice
to live with uncertainty or the choice to know
for certain. The choice to carry a pregnancy to
term or the choice to terminate the pregnancy.
The legal and ethical principles that drive
the debate in reproductive genetic testing depend on the model of patient autonomy, right
to privacy and choice. Nondirective counseling and the informed-consent process are
based on our assumption that patient choice
is given. Proponents of reproductive genetic
testing argue that with more genetic information there will be more choice.
But choice is not that simple. From the
preconception stage forward. the illusion of
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will become into providing the services. The
choice may raise fundamental questions.
will highlight problems from preconception profession has the power and the responsibilthrough birth that should shake our security ity to question the risks and benefits of genetic
over choice. Throughout this discussion it is testing in the broader context of comprehenimponant to point out that, for those women sive pregnancy care. and in educating the popwho have little or no access to prenatal care, ulation as to how infrequently genetic abnorgenetic services are not available. For these malities contribute to the less than perfect
baby.
women choice is not an option.
(3) If a woman makes an informed choice
( 1) In the ideal world. carrier screening
prior to pregnancy is a joint responsibility of to be tested. can she place limits on the inforthe couple. Obtaining information about mation she wants to know? If not. she must be
probabilities of genetic risk may help to clar- told ahead of time what conditions are being
ify decision making about reproduction. This tested for and the limitations, if any, to test
is a shared responsibility. However, once the results. It would appear that a woman's choice
decision is made to conceive with genetically to be tested need not prevent her from waivlinked sperm and egg, the responsibility shifts ing knowledge about certain types of genetic
exclusively to the woman. This is so even if information.
she is not the carrier of the risky genetic link.
(4) Conflict of interest can impact on
The decision to conceive. often tied to the choice. Genetic counseling should not be a
need for genetic connection. shifts all genetic risk management session scheduled just prior
testing to the woman. She is the sole subject of to genetic testing in which the woman signs an
testing. In this context, does she have a choice informed consent form. Rather there should
not to be tested? If she consented to precon- be separation between counseling and proceception testing, does she have a choice not to dures. Genetic counseling is a process sepabe tested once pregnant? Has she. waived her rate and apart from testing. Genetic counselors should not feel that they have failed themright to take her chances?
.
(2) Most genetic testing is done on women selves or their employers if a woman choos~s
only during pregnancy. Men are yet to experi- not to be tested. But that can often be the·
ence as a group the impact of such a massive financial result. In this situation the woman
screening effort. As testing becomes incorpo- may only have the illusion of choice by partirated into prenatal care practice, are women cipating in a genetic counseling session just
presented with the choice to refuse such test- prior to a scheduled test.
(5) During genetic counseling it must be
ing? Providers. who set the standard of care,
may feel they do not even have the option to clear what options a woman will have after
give women a choice. Is it the fear of liabilitv receiving test results. Obviously. there is inthat makes providers believe that they must creasing concern that. as genetic testing is
provide genetic testing without discussing op- expanding, the constitutional right to choose
tions with the pregnant woman? Yet if choice to terminate a pregnancy is contracting. The
is our guiding principle, providers have the Webster [1) decision makes it more likely that
duty to set out the choices for testing, not just each state will set its own rules for categorizorder tests without thought. Ironically. the ing what conditions justify abortion. Some
more the profession buys into the expansion states will allow abortion for 'fetal defect'.
of genetic testing and increases consumer ex- congenital anomalies and the like. but as
pectations. the more trapped the profession reproductive testing increases how will abor-
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tion legislation adjust? Such state law variation will require woman and providers in each
state to adjust accordingly. For the future of
reproductive genetic testing very much depends on the future of the right to choose.
Furthermore. the Rusr [2] decision confirms that the federal government may allow
limits on the content of disclosure about abortion in family planning programs. Even if some
assume that medically indicated abortion may
be discussed under certain conditions. it is
clear that the Rust climate of silencing providers will further limit choice for the poor. particularly with respect to disclosure on genetic testing and abortion services. Legal confusion often breeds further access problems for women.
In fact. a number of states have inconsistent
_ ~ laws and public policies which may fund ge. . netic services but not abortion.
( 6) In addition to such barriers. the profession is responsible in practice for limiting
choice by abandoning the care of the pregnant
woman midstream. The medical profession
needs to assure that either the providers making the referral for genetic testing or those
offering the genetic testing procedures provide for abortion services. The medical profession needs to bener coordinate such services for the woman. At a time when training
in genetic testing is expanding, training in
abortion services among residency programs
is decreasing. Without such continuity. the
provider is in fact limiting choice for the
woman.
(7) Some women feel they have no choice
but to abort because there is insufficient information on prognosis. quality of life and services for the disabled. And do those women
who do not abort waive future support for
children born with disabilities? This fear may
be real as we hear reports of insurance companies and health maintenance organizations
who threaten not to cover expenses for children born by choice with genetic disorders.
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Causation

With choice comes responsibility for results. Reproductive genetic testing assumes a
cause and effect. But causation in this context
is very confusing. The questions raised by
wrongful-birth and wrongful-life actions may
help illustrate the connection between choice
and causation.
The wrongful-birth action assumes that.
because the provider failed to disclose information about genetic testing. or failed to provide the correct test result. the provider
caused a harm that requires compensation to
the mother (or parents) of a child born with a
genetic disorder. The harm is not that the
child was born with a genetic disorder. Rather. the harm is that the mother was deprived
of the right to know about a testable genetic
condition and then could not exercise her
right to choose whether to terminate the pregnancy. Obviously. if choice was not at issue.
there might be no causation between the provider's negligence and the harm.
On the other hand. most courts have been
a lot less willing to recognize a wrongful-life
action brought by a child born \vith a genetic
disorder against the provider for the same
negligent conduct. In this case. some courts
cannot find a causal link. The provider does
not have a 'duty to rescue· the fetus from
being born. And what is in fact the harm to be
compensated? To establish such a duty might
require the court to value nonexistence over a
life with disability. As noted above. the failure
to provide genetic testing. for example. did
not cause the genetic condition. And in this
case. the provider is not depriving the child of
a choice. In utero. the fetus did not have the
choice to make.
Of course. the courts have made assumptions about both choice and causation. In this
context. could women (and parents) have a
'duty to rescue· a fetus from being born with
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disabilities? Does a woman have both a legal
duty to discover genetic traits and to act to
prevent the fetus from being born with a
genetic disorder? At least one commentator
has also characterized the failure to be tested
(and to abort a fetus with a genetic disorder)
as analogous to fetal or child abuse. To date, a
few states. rejecting such a legal duty, specifically provide that there is no such action recognized under state law.
Yet there has been a trend in other areas of
maternal behavior to draw connections between maternal behavior and predictions that
such behavior caused harm to the fetus.
Threats of child abuse. criminal prosecutions
and tort liability have been raised against
women. for example, who use drugs and alcohol du•··ing pregnancy. Once we pinpoint
blame on pregnant women for causing 'bad
outcomes'. are we on a slippery slope? Particularly if we assume women have choices.
some may argue that we should assign causal
responsibility for women who give birth to
children with genetic disorders.

Control

Ultimately. the expansion of reproductive
genetic testing will be about control. Control
over what choices get made. who makes them.
and who judges them will directly influence
how we shape to law's response. The assumptions we make about control over reproductive choice. and control over causing or preventing 'hann'. will impact on the development of future law. Will providers of genetic

testing determine what genetic information is
relevant to be tested for and disclosed in carrier screening programs and to pregnant
women? What limitations will the government place on the access to such information?
What control will there be between access to
genetic services. abortion services and/or support services for families and children with
disabilities? What increase in control will laws
give the medical profession to define 'fetal
defect' and medical necessity for ·responsible'
limits on abortion. Will the expansion in genetic testing also signal the remedicalization
of abortion as a social welfare or public health
strategy? What control will the law maintain
over a woman's right to conceive without
prior genetic information and to carry a pregnancy to term without genetic testing?
These questions do not have easy answers.
Both providers and consumers must recognize that there are limits on control. Most
importantly. we cannot assume that we can
control a pregnancy outcome. The expansion
of genetic testing may assume we can, but in
the end we must recognize that conditions
beyond our knowledge or grasp may cause
outcomes that we cannot control. Certainly
law cannot change this reality. Once we realize this fact we may be more willing to question our assumptions and accept our limitations.
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